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NTSB

Dec 182010
 
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Tenerife Accident (1977)

Courtesy: FAA An updated FAA animation of the Tenerife accident.

KLM Flight 4805, Boeing 747-206B, PH-BUF, ground collision with Pan American Flight 1736, Boeing 747-121, N735PA

Location: Tenerife, Canary Islands (Spain)

Date: March 27, 1977

Both aircraft – KLM Flight 4805, a Boeing 747-206B, Reg. No. PH-BUF; and Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 1736, a Boeing 747-121, Reg. No. N736PA, – had been diverted to Los Rodeos Airport on the Spanish island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands due to a bombing at the airport at their final destination, the neighboring island of Gran Canaria. Later, when flights to Gran Canaria resumed, the aircraft collided on the runway in Tenerife as the KLM Boeing 747 initiated a takeoff while the Pan Am aircraft was using the runway to taxi. The Spanish investigative authority, Subsecretaria de Aviacion Civil, found that the fundamental cause of the accident was the KLM captain: 1. Took off without clearance; 2. Did not obey the “stand by for take off” direction from the tower; 3. Did not interrupt take off on learning that the Pan Am aircraft was still on the runway; and 4. In reply to the KLM flight engineer’s query as to whether the Pan Am aircraft had already left the runway, the KLM captain replied emphatically in the affirmative. The investigation also believed that the KLM captain’s decision to take off may have been influenced by revised crew duty time limitations recently enacted by the Dutch government. The restrictions were inflexible and highly penalizing to the captain, if exceeded. With a total of 583 fatalities, the crash remains the deadliest accident in aviation history. All 248 passengers and crew aboard the KLM flight were killed. There were also 335 fatalities and 61 survivors on the Pan Am flight.

Sep 182010
 
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Midair Collision Over Hudson River NTSB Sunshine Meeting

Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the probable cause of last year’s midair collision over the Hudson River that resulted in the deaths of all nine persons aboard the two aircraft were the inherent limitations of “see-and-avoid” concept and a Teterboro Airport air traffic controller’s nonpertinent telephone conversation at the time of the collision. The see-and-avoid technique of averting mid-air collisions was not effective because of the difficulty the airplane pilot had in seeing the helicopter until the final seconds before the collision. In addition, the Teterboro Airport local controller engaged in a personal telephone conversation, which distracted him from his air traffic control duties, including the timely transfer of communications for the accident airplane to the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) tower and correcting the airplane pilot’s incorrect read-back of the EWR tower frequency.

The Safety Board met today in a five-hour public meeting to determine the probable cause of the accident and issued five recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration for improving the safety of the national airspace, and in particular, the airspace over the Hudson River near New York City. The Safety Board noted that contributing to the cause of the accident were the ineffective use by both pilots of their aircrafts’ electronic advisory system to maintain awareness of other air traffic, FAA’s procedures for transfer of communications among air traffic facilities near the Hudson River, and FAA regulations that did not provide for adequate vertical separation of aircraft operating over the Hudson River.

On August 8, 2009, a Piper PA-32R-300 airplane, N71MC, and a Eurocopter AS350BA helicopter, N401LH, operated by Liberty Helicopters, collided over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The airplane flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, with a pilot and two passengers. The helicopter flight, which carried a pilot and five passengers, was conducting an air tour of the area under the provisions of 14 CFR Parts 135 and 136. No flight plans were filed or were required for either flight, and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

“This collision could have been prevented,” NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said. “While traffic alerts go a long way in helping pilots “see and avoid” other aircraft, these technologies are not, in and of themselves, enough to keep us safe. Strong operating procedures, professionalism, and commitment to the task at hand — these are all essential to safety.”

As a result of the accident investigation, the NTSB made recommendations to the FAA regarding changes within the special flight rules area (SFRA) surrounding the Hudson River corridor; vertical separation among aircraft operating in the Hudson River SFRA; see-and-avoid guidance; and helicopter electronic traffic advisory systems.

A synopsis of the Board’s report, including the probable cause, conclusions, and recommendations, is available on the NTSB’s website, at http://ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1005.html. The Board’s full report will be available on the website in several weeks.